One of the key elements of the tariffs announced earlier this year by U.S. President Donald Trump on Japan was on automobiles and auto parts.

That sector has long been a contentious trade issue between the two nations.

Documents declassified on Dec. 24 by the Foreign Ministry describe the heated negotiations that were held 30 years ago.

On June 27, 1995, Ryutaro Hashimoto, the trade minister, met in Geneva with Mickey Kantor, the U.S. trade representative.

The initial session led to the iconic photo of Hashimoto pointing a bamboo “shinai” sword given to him by Kantor at his own throat, indicating what he felt would be the mood of the talks.

The auto negotiations were the result of an emphasis on economic policy under U.S. President Bill Clinton, who was inaugurated in 1993.

Washington demanded that Japan open up its market to reduce the massive trade surplus it had in relation to the United States.

But Japan refused to accept any numerical targets.

When Kantor met Hashimoto, the Foreign Ministry documents show that the U.S. trade representative asked for plans by Japanese automakers for production and parts procurement in the United States prior to the release of a joint statement about the negotiations.

Included in the ministry documents is a report by Shinichi Nishimiya, who headed the Foreign Ministry’s Second North America Division. Nishimiya was a member of the Japanese delegation led by Hashimoto.

Nishimiya would later serve as senior deputy foreign minister and in 2012 was appointed as ambassador to China, but he died of a heart attack before assuming his post.

Kantor wanted the figures from the Japanese automakers because he wanted to include them in the joint statement as a way of showing results from the negotiations.

Knowing that Japan had long opposed setting numerical targets, the U.S. side went so far as to compromise and said the figures in the joint statement could be described as estimates made by Kantor.

Japanese officials from the Foreign Ministry and what was then the Ministry of International Trade and Industry discussed with Hashimoto what to do.

The Foreign Ministry document includes the exchange between high-ranking ministry officials.

A MITI official opposed disclosing any figures to Kantor on the grounds that if the U.S. side felt the numbers were insufficient, they would demand even larger figures.

But Koichi Haraguchi, the director-general of the Foreign Ministry’s Economic Affairs Bureau, said the talks would not proceed unless the numbers were presented.

He added that the wording of the joint statement could be fiddled with to hide where the numbers came from.

Hashimoto said that not showing the numbers was unthinkable. He reminded everyone of Japan’s basic stance of doing everything it could and if no agreement was reached, that would challenge the United States to impose economic sanctions.

On the morning of June 28, 1995, Hashimoto told Kantor what he was about to say was absolutely confidential. He then explained the plans of the Japanese automakers.

At working-level talks, Japan agreed to include wording in the joint statement that the figures were Kantor’s estimates. But Japanese officials also asked that wording be added to the effect “this estimate exceeds the range for which the (Japanese) government can hold responsibility.”

While U.S. officials were at first hesitant about the addition, when Kantor showed up for the meeting, he suggested that his name be replaced by the U.S. office of the trade representative.

That appeared to settle the matter.

But when Hashimoto and Kantor held a joint news conference later on June 28, the U.S. side had not included its estimates so the document had blank spaces where figures should have appeared.

Japanese automakers on their own began announcing their plans for the United States and U.S. officials added those numbers in the joint statement released on June 29.

In his report, Nishimiya explained that the ministry refused to submit to numerical targets because he held a sense of crisis.

He was worried that Japanese public opinion toward the United States would turn negative if negotiations always ended with the superpower getting its way after pushing through its demands.

He also felt that the Clinton administration wanted by all means to show some positive results from the talks, even if that meant the numbers were their own estimates.

Until refusing to accept numerical targets in 1995, Tokyo often compromised in trade matters with the United States in steel and automobiles, exercising voluntary restraint on its exports or accepting target market shares for foreign semiconductors sold in Japan.

The strong stance taken in 1995 was partly due to the establishment of the World Trade Organization that year and the growing international sentiment favoring free trade.

But with the Trump administration not interested in free trade, Japan this year was forced to accept such numerical targets as investing $550 billion (about 85 trillion yen) in the United States and buying an additional $8 billion worth of U.S. farm produce.

(This article was written by senior staff writers Hirobumi Ohinata and Naotaka Fujita.)

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This article is part of a series based on diplomatic documents declassified by Japan’s Foreign Ministry in December 2025.