Tokyo’s used bookshop district of Jinbocho is a haven for wealthy Chinese intellectuals trying to gauge Japanese sentiment toward China after fleeing their homeland to escape repression.

The exodus of Chinese who once held key posts in mainly cultural and economic fields might have gone largely unnoticed were it not for the backstreet get-togethers in selected bookstores of the celebrated area of Chiyoda Ward.

A recent gathering at one such outlet was presided over by Japanese writer Minetoshi Yasuda, a Chinese speaker.

Yasuda specializes in current affairs, with a focus on Asia. He is the author of several books, one of which is “8964.” The title derives from the June 4, 1989, date of Beijing’s bloody crackdown against student-led demonstrations in sprawling Tiananmen Square that is thought to have left hundreds, perhaps thousands, dead.

Yasuda is also part of a six-member Asahi Shimbun critique committee that contributes articles to a column section in rotation.

Tokyo is currently home to at least three salons surreptitiously operating inside bookstores for intellectuals who, fearful of running afoul of the Chinese Communist Part, fled to Japan in a phenomenon known as “run.”

The theme of the latest bookstore event was Japanese perceptions and discourses about China.

THEN AND NOW

Around 70 percent of Japanese viewed China in a favorable light during the 1970s and ’80s, according to the Cabinet Office in Tokyo.

But that changed overnight with the bloodshed in Tiananmen Square.

Anti-Japan demonstrations that erupted across China in the mid-2000s worsened the situation, and Japanese still harbor a strong dislike for Beijing. Polls show that more than 80 percent of Japanese today do not feel “a sense of familiarity” with China.

Themes that are “unfavorable for the Chinese Communist Party” in today’s Japanese society range widely from those criticizing human rights problems in China to anti-Chinese movements in Japan. The anti-Chinese movements are mainly led by the deterioration of the Japanese people’s sentiment toward China.

The discussion elicited a spirited response from those present.

For many, the topic came across as fresh because memories of the anti-Japan protests had faded. Additionally, recent Chinese arrivals often find it difficult to grasp public opinion in Japan due to language problems.

The “run” phenomenon was a driving factor behind the birth of the salons, which are also increasingly attended by those well-versed in the inner workings of Japan-China relations.

In years past, Chinese relished the freedom of speech and economic activity to be found in Hong Kong. But Beijing then started tightening the screws with draconian security laws and through political repression.

As a result, Japan became the “forefront of liberty” for many Chinese.

Hundreds of Chinese who once held senior positions in cultural and economic circles in China have relocated to Japan in recent years.

As a result, it doesn’t take much effort these days to set up a meeting in Japan with people of the following caliber: a former executive of China’s state media, a lawyer familiar with the oppression of ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang Uighur autonomous region or an insider of a state-owned financial entity, to cite a few whose voices inside China are rarely heard.

This has given Japan a reputation for having top China watcher status with regard to getting the scoop on Chinese critical of the political structure in their homeland.

This goes a long way to explain denunciation in Tokyo in 2022 of Beijing’s strict zero-COVID policy, which effectively kept China locked up.

How Japanese society should embrace and make the best use of this unexpected arrival of Chinese expertise represents a major policy challenge for Tokyo.

Underhand moves by Beijing outside China to stop antigovernment activists overseas from badmouthing its policies is another issue that perplexes Japan.

China is known to have violated Japanese sovereignty by setting up an “overseas branch” of its security department apparatus, something it apparently brazenly does in selected countries with which it has diplomatic relations. More instances are expected, say Japanese sources.

During the era of burgeoning friendship between Japan and China, the Chinese phrase “yiyidaishui” (two things close to each other across a narrow water body) was often used to refer to the two nations’ intertwined bonds.

The current Tokyo and Beijing relationship is the exact opposite of that. In fact, Japan nowadays is more prone to the influence of China’s political fluctuations than ever.

In that sense, it could be said that a new form of “yiyidaishui” is emerging.