An annual white paper on defense was released July 28 for the first time since the administration of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida drastically changed the restrained security policy of postwar Japan.

The changes include allowing the nation to possess enemy base strike capabilities and deciding to double defense spending.

The government has said that the understanding and the cooperation of the public are an indispensable premise of national defense and has seen the annual white paper as useful for obtaining them.

This year’s white paper has assigned space to the government’s stance on how and why Japan’s three key national security documents were revised late last year. Few statements in it, however, have directly answered the public’s questions and concerns about the matter.

The paper thus falls far short of making up for the lack of national debate that has been held over the subject.

The white paper points out, at the start, that the international community is facing the “greatest postwar trial yet” from attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force, such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

It describes the moves of China, which is building up its military power and its pressure on Taiwan, as presenting an “unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge.”

The paper says North Korea, which has repeatedly launched missiles, poses an “even more grave and imminent threat to Japan’s national security than ever before.”

The document thus emphasizes the severe security environment surrounding Japan as a rationale for the country’s policy shift.

The white paper, in the meantime, has set aside a “column” explanatory page to address enemy base strike capabilities, which represent one of the pillars of Japan’s measures to fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities.

The column explains the limitations of existing missile defense networks and the logic of the government’s stance on the matter.

It says the targets of the enemy base strike capabilities, termed “counterstrike capabilities” in the document, will be “rigorously limited to military targets” but has left ambiguities by saying that decisions on the measures to be actually taken will be made “in light of individual and concrete situations.”

One could question whether the proper assessment of the launching of an enemy attack can even be made so that Japan will not be making a pre-emptive strike, which would go against international law.

There are also concerns about whether targets can be detected accurately in the first place, how roles will be divided between the Self-Defense Forces and the U.S. military, and the risk of inviting an arms race that could end up heightening regional tensions.

The white paper seldom appears to be squarely addressing these and other questions.

One country’s military buildup aimed at improving its own security could prompt a military buildup of another nation, thereby reducing the former country’s security on the contrary.

To avoid the pitfall of that “security dilemma,” there should be persistent efforts, however difficult they may be, to seek dialogue and trust-building.

While such efforts should be promoted on the level of the entire government, including through diplomacy, communication between the defense authorities of different nations is of no small significance, as one of similar endeavors, for the purpose of avoiding accidental military encounters.

A hotline between the defense authorities of Japan and China finally entered operation in May. Exchanges between the SDF and the Chinese military are also being resumed.

The white paper only mentioned those moves near the end of a section dedicated to defense cooperation with other nations. Similar efforts should, however, be expanded and strengthened into continual and multilayered work.

The National Security Strategy of Japan says the country will use its “comprehensive national power, including diplomatic and economic capabilities,” to defend itself.

That comprehensive power should be exercised not only to strengthen the deterrent capabilities but also to ease tensions.

That is the duty not just of the Defense Ministry and the SDF but of the entire government as well.

--The Asahi Shimbun, July 30