There is no question that the security environment surrounding Japan has grown more volatile and threatening, and as such supports the case for a steady enhancement of the nation’s defense capabilities.

But gaining possession of the ability to strike enemy bases, to hit targets in another country’s territory, would eviscerate the nation’s long-established principle of sticking to a strictly defensive security policy. Doubling the nation’s defense spending could lead to an unrestrained military buildup.

Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has announced a radical and dangerous departure from the highly restrictive postwar policy without seeking national debate on the change. The administration is rushing headlong into beefing up the nation’s military muscle without developing plans or taking actions to improve the environment for building peace.

INTEGRATED JAPAN-U.S. OPERATIONS

The Kishida Cabinet on Dec. 16 formally endorsed new versions of three key security policy documents: the National Security Strategy (NSS), which sets guiding foreign and security policy principles for the next decade, and two renamed policy documents to flesh out the principles described in the NSS, the National Defense Strategy and the Defense Capability Enhancement Plan.

During a news conference to announce these documents, Kishida stressed the need for a fundamental enhancement of Japan’s defense ability, contending that the current capabilities of the Self-Defense Forces are not sufficient to “deter threats and defend this nation.”

But the centerpiece of his new defense strategy is the possession of the ability to strike enemy bases, which, even though it is described as “counterattack capabilities,” entails the risk of triggering a Japanese action that is seen as a pre-emptive strike in violation of international law. The policy shift could also risk provoking military countermeasures from potential enemies and heighten tensions in the region.

The government maintains that such capabilities will work as effective deterrence to discourage an enemy from attacking Japan, but some experts are skeptical.

Under the strictly defensive security policy, the SDF remained solidly committed to restricting its role to that of the “shield” to defend the nation while relying on the U.S. military to act as the “spear” by using its military capabilities to strike enemy targets. If the SDF performs some of the “spear” functions, the division of roles between the two sides under the bilateral security alliance is likely to change significantly. This is another consequence of the policy change that cannot be overlooked.

The NSS also calls for “coordination of operations” between the Japanese and U.S. militaries for bilateral cooperation in responding to security threats to Japan. To obtain capabilities to strike enemy targets, Japan plans to purchase a large number of Tomahawk cruise missiles from the United States, in addition to upgrading domestically made missiles.

One big question is whether Japan will be able to make its own decisions in defending itself when the Japanese and U.S. military capabilities and operations are becoming increasingly integrated.

The concern is that the SDF’s systems and capabilities may be simply incorporated into military campaigns led by the U.S. forces. No matter how strongly the government may insist that the defense-only principle will be upheld--despite this policy change and vow that pre-emptive strikes will not be allowed--there is no guarantee that Japan’s neighbors will believe these pledges.

The actions the government are taking could increase the risk of the nation coming under attack.

RESPONDING TO CHINA’S EXPANSION

The biggest security challenge for Japan is how to respond to China’s rapid military buildup and its willingness to change the status quo by force.

The first NSS, which was compiled in 2013 when Shinzo Abe was prime minister, characterized China’s security threat as a “matter of concern for the international community, including Japan.”

The revised version describes China as “an unprecedented and largest strategic challenge” to Japan. Although the government did not adopt the word “threat” in referring to China, despite a request from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, the document adopted a tougher stance toward China because of Beijing’s aggressive naval expansion in both the East and South China Seas, as well as heightened tensions in the Taiwan Strait.

The term “strategic challenge” echoes the same description adopted by Washington for its new national security strategy. From the U.S. point of view, China is challenging its hegemony. Washington’s strategic goal is probably aimed at defeating Beijing’s challenge.

For Japan, however, China is a near neighbor with which it has strong historical and economic ties. An armed conflict in East Asia would cause far more damage to the lives and livelihoods of the Japanese than to those of the American people.

The national interests of Japan and the United States do not totally coincide. Japan’s role should be to make all-out efforts to ease tensions and build trust in the region with a determination to prevent a war from breaking out.

The NSS says “first, diplomatic power” and “second, defense power.” But the government has focused sharply on bolstering defense capabilities and devoted much of its diplomatic efforts to strengthening ties with countries confronting China.

WITHOUT EXPLANATIONS OR CONSENSUS

There have also been serious problems with the process leading to the decision on the security policy shift.

Since he announced his intention to revise the three security policy documents last autumn, Kishida has only repeated that he would make the decisions concerning the new capabilities to be acquired, the scale of spending growth and financing plans as a package.

As for the proposal to acquire the ability to strike enemy bases, he has only said repeatedly that the government would “consider all options without ruling out any.” He avoided offering specific explanations about the policy shift during the campaign for the July Upper House election and at the Diet.

Immediately before the policy decisions, he announced plans to increase security-related budget expenditures to an equivalent of 2 percent of gross domestic product in five years and finance 1 trillion yen ($7.4 billion) of the increase with tax increases. He acted in an extremely rash manner in making these decisions.

The government should have presented multiple options and provided careful explanations about them and the risks involved. Then, it should have made the decisions after winning the consent of the people. Using a medical analogy, the administration has unilaterally given a radical prescription without going through the process of “informed consent” and is now trying to compel the public to take a powerful drug expected to cause serious side effects.

The decision on the timing of planned tax hikes has been delayed in the face of opposition within the LDP. Kishida has decided to purchase fighter jets and missiles without developing viable financing plans based on stable revenue sources. The administration has even broken a fiscal taboo by deciding to use construction bonds to fund part of the enhanced defense spending. In short, these are the results of the way the administration has forged ahead with the initiative without ensuring the transparency and care required.

During the news conference, Kishida also said the planned expansion of the nation’s defense capabilities cannot be achieved without “cooperation and understanding” of the people. If he means what he said, Kishida should offer meticulous explanations about the policy shift during the ordinary Diet session next year and other opportunities to speak in public and demonstrate a willingness to reconsider the matter.

--The Asahi Shimbun, Dec. 17