The core philosophy underlying Japan’s basic policy principles concerning arms exports is that as a nation whose Constitution upholds pacifism it should not export arms that fuel international conflict.

This credo is at the heart of the former three principles regarding arms exports and the new three principles of defense equipment transfer that have replaced them.

The government must not allow these principles to be eroded gradually to open the door to exports of deadly weapons.

A working group of lawmakers of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and its junior coalition partner, Komeito, has been debating easing restrictions on arms exports in response to the revisions to three key security policy documents last year.

The group recently released an interim report on its work that lists key points of the discussions.

Over some issues, differing opinions are described. As a whole, however, the report offers unmistakable support to allowing exports of lethal weapons including those Japan develops jointly with other countries, an apparent reference to Tokyo’s new project to develop fighter jets with other countries.

Under the current three principles concerning arms exports, only five categories of defense equipment--rescue, transport, warning, surveillance and minesweeping--can be sold to Japan’s security partners.

The government, however, has said weapons that fall into one of these categories but can kill people and destroy things, or “weapons as defined by the Self-Defense Forces law,” cannot be exported.

The report veers from this policy by stating there has been a “consensus” among the group members on lifting the ban on exports of certain types of military equipment with lethal capabilities.

They include, for example, minesweepers equipped with machine guns to dispose of mines or ships for warning and surveillance operations armed with weapons to stop suspicious ships for on-site inspections.

The report also includes the opinion that the categories should be scrapped. This stance signals the worrisome possibility that the scope of weapons Japan can export could be unlimitedly widened.

Under the current rules concerning weapons Japan has developed with other nations, Japan’s development partners need to gain the consent of the Japanese government for exporting the weapons.

The report says most of the group members agreed that Japan will inevitably agree to the exports in such cases. If Japan’s partners can export jointly developed arms, the argument goes, there is a reasonable case for enabling Japan to export such weapons.

There is little doubt that this argument has been prompted by Japan’s decision to team with Britain and Italy to develop next-generation fighter jets. Since it is now difficult for any country to develop a new fighter on its own because of huge technological challenges and costs, there is a growing global trend toward joint development.

But the fact is that fighter jets are lethal weapons, pure and simple.

It is next to impossible for Japan to control how its development partners will use jointly developed weapons. Tokyo will also have to become involved in joint arms development projects over the long term for maintenance and management purposes.

The government’s approach to this issue is quite questionable. It concluded the trilateral agreement on the joint fighter development first and is now trying to adjust the principles concerning arms exports to make them consistent with the project.

As an extension of this approach, the government may also argue that if Japan can export jointly developed lethal weapons, there is no good reason to ban exports of such weapons that Japan has developed on its own.

The report also calls for enabling “support to countries facing aggression, the use of force or the threat by force by other nations that violate international law.”

There are, however, many cases that cannot be clearly recognized as aggression in violation of international law, unlike Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In some cases, military actions against other countries can be viewed differently by countries in different positions.

Such an important security policy change must not be worked out simply in closed-door debates among lawmakers of the ruling camp. This matter should be subject to broad public debate in open venues such as the Diet.

--The Asahi Shimbun, July 7