Editor’s note: The following account is based on information provided by multiple sources.

***

On the night of Sept. 5, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba entered a private room at Taikan En, a Chinese restaurant inside Hotel New Otani Tokyo, just a stone’s throw from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s headquarters.

The gathering was officially described as “dinner with aides,” but behind the scenes, Ishiba had summoned his political allies for an urgent, secret meeting.

In attendance were Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya, internal affairs minister Seiichiro Murakami, digital transformation minister Masaaki Taira, and two deputy chief Cabinet secretaries, Keiichiro Tachibana and Kazuhiko Aoki.

The pressing matter was how to handle a planned “confirmation of will” by LDP members demanding an early party leadership election.

The party members were expected to submit signed and sealed documents to LDP headquarters on Sept. 8, pushing for a vote.

Ishiba’s team needed to chart its response.

In front of each participant at the meeting was a single A4-sized sheet listing five possible scenarios labeled A to E.

His options were:

(A) Announce intention to resign by Sept. 7 → Lawmakers retract their signatures → Step down as prime minister;

(B) Do not announce intention to resign by Sept. 7 → Majority of lawmakers sign → Step down as prime minister;

(C) Do not announce intention to resign by Sept. 7 → No majority reached → Remain in office;

(D) Do not announce intention to resign by Sept. 8 → Dissolve the Lower House; and

(E) Do not announce intention to resign by Sept. 8 → Enter the party leadership race / Step down.

According to the sources, the discussion that followed was animated and at times heated.

“We haven’t made policy mistakes, nor have we put our foot in our mouth,” one participant argued. “To resign just because we lost an election would mean admitting the opposition’s populism is correct.”

He urged Ishiba to dissolve the Lower House and call a snap general election, saying, “We need to appeal directly to the people.”

Another offered a different perspective, saying: “Opinion polls show that most of the public doesn’t think you need to resign. The Cabinet approval rating is climbing. You should aim to be re-elected as party leader.”

But one participant called for Ishiba to step down.

“If you push forward like this and get battered, you may lose your willpower completely. You have other opportunities ahead,” he said.

Throughout the meeting, Ishiba grunted “hmm” while listening to and weighing each opinion.

He agonized over what to do until the last possible moment.

After the secret meeting, a veteran LDP member heard a startling report from one of the attendees: “Ishiba might actually dissolve the Lower House.”

Shocked, the veteran cautioned against such a move. The insider replied: “If he does, I’ll tender my resignation. Still, Ishiba just might go through with it.”

Within the LDP, many believed that Ishiba was stirring up rumors about a Lower House dissolution to pressure lawmakers not to seek an early leadership election.

A young LDP member said, “He’d never actually dissolve the Lower House.”

A senior party member called it “just a bluff to prevent calls for an early election.”

However, Ishiba had, in fact, been seriously contemplating a Lower House dissolution even before that secret meeting.

On the evening of Sept. 3, Ishiba suddenly summoned Foreign Minister Iwaya and Defense Minister Gen Nakatani to his official residence via a back entrance for another covert discussion about possible next steps.

Among Ishiba’s choices—remaining in office, resigning or dissolving the Lower House—the question of dissolution in particular divided his close aides.

One person feared that dissolving the Lower House only to protect Ishiba’s position would offend the public and lead to another crushing election defeat for the LDP.

“Is there really a ‘just cause’ for dissolution?” the individual asked Ishiba. “I don’t think you should dissolve (the Lower House). Wait and see how many signatures actually pile up for an early leadership election.”

After that talk, Ishiba confided to those around him: “This is really tough. I need to think it over tonight.”

Ishiba’s serious consideration of dissolving the Lower House actually began on the evening of Aug. 24, after a dinner with former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi.

As prime minister, Koizumi overcame LDP opposition to his postal privatization plan by calling a snap election. The LDP won but voters punished Koizumi’s opponents in the party.

Hearing Koizumi’s account of the “postal dissolution,” Ishiba started contemplating a snap election, especially as media polls began trending in his favor.

“In the end, it may be right to let the people decide,” Ishiba told those close to him. “If push comes to shove, I might play the dissolution card.”

Still, most of his inner circle, aside from a handful of close aides, opposed the move.

Former LDP policy chief Kisaburo Tokai warned: “This would be a dissolution with no outlook. It’s not like Koizumi’s postal dissolution; the situation is different.”

A senior official from the prime minister’s office also asked Ishiba, “Why involve the public in what is essentially an internal party matter?”

Before becoming prime minister, Ishiba had expressed a negative view of the “Article 7 dissolution.”

Under Article 7 of the Constitution, even if a no-confidence motion against the Cabinet is voted down, the Lower House can be dissolved as an act of state by the emperor through the Cabinet’s advice and consent.

Since the stipulation benefits the current administration, Ishiba had said it “contradicts the spirit of the Constitution.”

The opposition quickly picked up on this point.

Yoshihiko Noda, leader of the main opposition Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, criticized Ishiba for considering an “Article 7 dissolution,” saying, “He was strongly opposed to it when Shinzo Abe was (prime minister).”

On Sept. 7, Ishiba called his close aides back to the official residence and finally conveyed his decision.

Ultimately, Ishiba chose “Plan A” from the five options presented at the secret meeting at the Chinese restaurant. He would announce his intention to resign.

One aide speculated about Ishiba’s state of mind, saying, “It must be frustrating, but he had probably reached the limits of his physical and mental strength.”

Later on Sept. 7, when he announced his resignation at a news conference, Ishiba was asked how seriously he had considered dissolving the Lower House.

He replied: “There certainly was a gap between what the public thought and what the party thought, and how I should view the fact. I do not deny that there were various opinions in between.”

(This article was written by Shun Suzuki, Shinkai Kawabe, Mizuki Sato and Kohei Morioka.)