Prime Minister Fumio Kishida became increasingly frustrated and agitated on New Year’s Day as he tried to grasp the scope of the damage from the Noto Peninsula earthquake.

He was in his office about an hour after the earthquake struck at 4:10 p.m. with a seismic intensity of a maximum 7 on the Japanese scale.

Only fragmentary reports were coming to the office about roads becoming unpassable and people being trapped under collapsed buildings.

Feeling he could not wait any longer, Kishida ordered aides to get him in touch with Shigeru Sakaguchi, the mayor of Wajima, Ishikawa Prefecture.

But no one knew where Sakaguchi was. There was one report that he was isolated in a community center.

Kishida finally reached Sakaguchi by phone at around 10 p.m., with Kishida and his aides standing around a cellphone put on speaker mode.

When Kishida asked Sakaguchi what the situation there was like, the mayor replied, “A large number of homes have collapsed. Roads have become impassable.”

Kishida asked, “How does this compare to past earthquakes?”

Sakaguchi replied, “The damage is on an incomparable scale.”

Kishida also spoke by phone with Masuhiro Izumiya, mayor of Suzu, Ishikawa Prefecture.

But when Kishida shortly thereafter met with reporters, he still had little specific details of the damage. He could only say every effort was being made to gather information but that it was proving a difficult task.

LACK OF COMMUNICATION

Kishida also gave no indication of how many people had died or were injured.

Such factors determine the level of a task force to be formed to assist following a natural disaster.

There are three levels to task forces. The second highest is normally set up when at least 100 people have either died or are reported missing.

But the decision to upgrade the initial task force to that second level was only made after Kishida spoke with the two mayors.

One member of that task force would be Tetsuo Saito, the infrastructure minister, who would be expected to lead the effort to restore roads and infrastructure to a usable state.

Saito was in Hiroshima on New Year’s Day but arrived at the infrastructure ministry in Tokyo at around 8 p.m.

Kishida never contacted him, however, and Saito did not go to the prime minister’s office.

The following morning, Saito and other ministry officials viewed footage taken from a helicopter over the Noto Peninsula and were stunned to find huge landslides and roads damaged in various places.

Saito immediately sent a high-ranking official with experience dealing with natural disasters to the Noto area to coordinate measures for the entire government.

The only Cabinet ministers Kishida met with on New Year’s Day were Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi and Yoshifumi Matsumura, the state minister in charge of disaster management.

He did not meet with Saito; Takeaki Matsumoto, the communications minister; or Defense Minister Minoru Kihara.

Saito was given direct instructions from Kishida on the evening of Jan. 2, but it was regarding the deadly collision on the runway at Haneda Airport between a Japan Airlines jet and a Japan Coast Guard plane.

Kishida told Saito to have the ministry deal with everything concerning the aircraft accident because the government had its hands full with the natural disaster in the Noto Peninsula.

Regarding the initial response to the earthquake, Saito told his associates, “We had absolutely no information about how many people had died or were missing. I never thought the damage would be so great. My understanding was not sufficient.”

Aides to Kishida tried to pass on as much information as they had, but the process was slow.

Increasingly frustrated, Kishida was told that damage to the roads in the area meant that the Self-Defense Forces, police and firefighters would not likely reach the region that day.

But Kishida raised his voice saying, “Do everything you have to so they can be dispatched there today.”

SLOW FROM THE START

Even members of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party have raised concerns that the Kishida administration was slow out of the gate in addressing the earthquake.

“The slow initial response was everything,” one Upper House member said. “After that, everything was reactive, and the government could not keep pace with the needs being raised in the quake-affected area.”

It was only on Jan. 7 that the central government and the Ishikawa prefectural government decided to limit traffic for part of the Noto Satoyama Kaido highway, which runs through the Noto Peninsula. Traffic jams had slowed the delivery of relief supplies and materials.

On Jan. 5, Kishida met with the leaders of other political parties and the suggestion was made then to restrict traffic on the main thoroughfare.

“We made the decision (to restrict traffic) because if the opposition parties were not opposed, they would not criticize us in the Diet,” a high-ranking government official said.

In May 2023, Suzu was hit by an earthquake with a seismic intensity of upper 6.

The Japan Meteorological Agency had urged caution since earthquakes in the region had been observed for more than two years.

But one high-ranking government official in charge of disaster management said, “There are many areas with a high danger of natural disaster, but we never discussed doing something for the Noto region beforehand.”

(This article was written by Shinkai Kawabe, Mizuki Sato, Shohei Sasagawa and Tamiyuki Kihara.)