Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s administration has unequivocally signaled its intent to quickly acquire military capabilities to strike enemy bases, the centerpiece of his security policy initiative to fundamentally enhance Japan’s defense.

The government has decided to procure U.S. Tomahawk cruise missiles in fiscal 2025, a year earlier than initially planned, and speed up development of domestic-made missiles.

China’s escalating military activities around Taiwan and the South China Sea, coupled with North Korea’s repeated missile launches, underscore the increasingly challenging security environment surrounding Japan.

The government argues that the changing security dynamics require Japan to urgently build “counterstrike” capabilities. Still, it is hard to say there is broad public consensus on introducing weaponry that could erode the nation’s long-held principle of maintaining a strictly defensive security policy.

The push to forge ahead with this plan, overlooking various questions and apprehensions, is unacceptable.

Newly appointed Defense Minister Minoru Kihara recently visited the United States and met with Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin.

Japan initially planned to buy up to 400 Block V missiles, the latest generation of Tomahawk, in fiscal 2026 and 2027. But the defense chiefs agreed to start the deployment in fiscal 2025 by replacing up to half the missile units with an earlier model, Block IV.

The government says the critical performance parameters of the earlier model, including range, are on par with the latest version. The first 200 Tomahawk missiles are set to be installed on Japan’s Aegis-equipped destroyers.

Japan’s capability to strike enemy bases, however, might alter the traditional division of defense roles, where the Self-Defense Forces act as the “shield” and the U.S. military as the “spear.” Moreover, Japan relies heavily on U.S. intelligence for accurate target detection and identification, which is crucial for effectively operating these missiles.

During their talks in Washington, Kihara and Austin emphasized accelerating discussions on the roles, missions and capabilities of the bilateral security alliance for the “effective operation of counterstrike capabilities under Japan-U.S. cooperation.”

As the integration of the Japanese and U.S. military operations and capabilities, including intelligence-sharing, will likely deepen, we are inevitably apprehensive about whether Japan can maintain its independence in decision-making.

Kihara has also instructed the Defense Ministry to move forward the timeline for developing various types of domestic missiles, currently planned to be introduced in fiscal 2026.

But the government has yet to determine such crucial details as where these missiles will be deployed, under what situations they will be used, or how they will be used.

With such a lack of transparency in the missile program, it may be difficult for the government to win broad public support for this undertaking.

Kihara and Austin also discussed the realities and issues concerning U.S. forces stationed in Japan. They reaffirmed that to maintain the stable presence of U.S. troops in Japan and their effective daily operations, the “understanding and cooperation from local communities” are essential. They agreed to work together to “mitigate the impact” on host communities, including those in Okinawa Prefecture.

However, there is a disturbingly wide disparity between the government’s words and actions toward Okinawa.

Against the local people’s wishes, the government has been steadfast in its plan to build a new U.S. base off the Henoko district of Nago in the prefecture to take over the functions of the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Ginowan, also in the prefecture.

It has even submitted a lawsuit requesting an administrative subrogation order to take over the process of approving the government’s revised plan for necessary land reclamation from the Okinawa prefectural government.

Shortly after his appointment, Kihara visited Miyakojima and Ishigakijima islands in Okinawa, pivotal sites in the SDF’s “southwest shift.” Yet, a meeting with Okinawa Governor Denny Tamaki did not materialize.

Without sincere dialogue, any talk of reducing the burden on Okinawa will ring hollow.

--The Asahi Shimbun, Oct. 8