With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the continued threats of using nuclear weapons, the future of nuclear disarmament seems unclear.

Alexander Kmentt, the director of the Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Department of the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, spoke online with The Asahi Shimbun about the road to nuclear disarmament.

Recently, the first Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in Vienna ended without officially documenting the chair’s summary, among other matters remaining inconclusive.

The second Conference of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) will be held in New York City in November.

Kmentt, who served as president of the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW in June 2022, talked with The Asahi Shimbun about the conferences. 

Excerpts of the interview follow:

Question: How would you evaluate the first NPT Preparatory Committee in Vienna, which wrapped up without issuing the final document or the chair’s summary?

Kmentt: The first NPT PrepCom was very disappointing, with deep divisions and geopolitical tensions being very apparent. This is greatly disconcerting for the vast majority of NPT states parties who want to see progress in the implementation of the NPT and constructive cooperation.

The fact that there was no agreed substantive final document at this PrepCom is, in itself, not so dramatic, since no major decisions are taken at such a meeting, which (only) is in preparation for the next Review Conference in 2026. However, the divisions that we see now make the prospects for 2026 look rather bleak.

The tensions within the NPT due to a lack of progress on nuclear disarmament, a re-emphasis on nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence in some states, nonproliferation pressures and geopolitical competition are putting a very serious strain on this treaty.

Q: How do you think this result of the NPT PrepCom will affect the upcoming second TPNW meeting of States Parties in November?

A: I do not see a direct effect but rather an indirect one. One could make the argument that what we saw at the NPT PrepCom just further highlights the case for the TPNW. The deep substantive divisions, the way procedures are applied in the NPT, the rigid approach to inclusivity, etc., are in clear contrast to how the TPNW Meetings of States Parties are conducted.

In the TPNW, there is a sense of constructive cooperation, an openness to listening to experts as well as to survivors and, most importantly, there is a strongly felt shared sense of urgency that the international community needs to change course on the nuclear weapons issue.

If states want to see progress on this issue and want to see the NPT implemented, support for the TPNW is today one of the key steps that states can take.

It is an investment into international law and a multilateral approach to nuclear weapons. I hope that some of the TPNW-skeptical countries will start to engage constructively with the TPNW. If you want to strengthen the NPT, you also have to engage constructively with the TPNW and its membership.

Q: You learned from survivor Sumiteru Taniguchi and other hibakusha and other survivors of the nuclear experiments that it is important to think of the nuclear issue from the survivors’ perspective or the humanitarian approach rather than the arms-control side or the concept or policy side.

But, as you mentioned, now everyone is talking about nuclear weapons or nuclear-deterrent policies, especially after Russia invaded Ukraine and is threatening to use nuclear weapons. So, how would you evaluate the current situation regarding the humanitarian approach, the TPNW side, the survivors’ side and the political side of a nuclear-deterrence policy?

A: First of all, you see in some countries a focus on nuclear weapons, but that’s not universal. You see it in Europe and you see it in Asia, and probably you see it in some countries in the Middle East as well. But then you still have over 150 countries who have made it very clear that they consider nuclear weapons as illegitimate weapons. So, it’s not right to say that the whole world is going for nuclear weapons.

It’s the countries that already have these weapons or rely on these weapons that think they need to rely more on these weapons. So, we have two different trends. We have one that goes in this direction, but we also have one that tries to make a different kind of argument.

So, I just want to ask the question, if there is more focus on nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrents, where will this lead to?

It will lead to a much more insecure world and it will lead to potentially more countries wanting nuclear weapons. And (believing) this is then a more secure world is, I think, very, very questionable.

And the second, and, of course, we have absolutely irresponsible behavior and nuclear threats by Russia, we have very dangerous behavior by North Korea. There are many negative trends that are disconcerting.

But I think the question that needs to be asked or the argument ... I mean, I understand the arguments behind nuclear deterrents, but I think we have to ask the question if the assumptions that nuclear deterrents provide security, if they hold up, if you look at what it actually means for the security of the whole world. If the risks of these consequences can be justified by the belief in nuclear deterrents.

I, in a way, want to counter that the TPNW is the humanitarian approach. I think the TPNW is very much a security approach. Yes, it looks at the humanitarian consequences, but that is security. A breakdown of infrastructure, people dying of radiation, that’s security.

So, it’s not that you have the sort of serious people who think about nuclear weapons and security, and then you have the sort of nice people who think about humanitarian consequences, no. (To think about) humanitarian consequences is very much security.

So, I think the conversation that we have to have is how sustainable is a security approach that is based on nuclear weapons? I think that’s the conversation that needs to be heard. So we are in a very difficult situation, I agree with that. But I think the TPNW is now the only international development on nuclear weapons that tries to point in a different direction, which makes it, I think, so essential at the moment.

Q: The TPNW is of course very important and should be universalized. But it is still a long way, I mean, halfway to being fulfilled because no nuclear weapons states or states under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, including Japan, have signed or ratified it. On the other hand, the NPT, its credibility has eroded now thanks to Russia’s irresponsible actions. So, what do you predict will be the future relationship between the two treaties, the NPT and the TPNW?

A: We have always said that a key part of the motivation for the TPNW was to return some credibility to the NPT. So, the credibility of the NPT is not only threatened by what Russia has done, which, of course, is true, but it is really mostly challenged by the blatant lack of implementation of disarmament obligations and commitments which have been given a long, long time ago and never implemented. That, in my view, more than anything else has undermined the credibility in the NPT.

So, the TPNW gives some momentum to Article 6 (of the NPT) and is therefore fully compatible. We very much regret that we cannot make progress with the NPT at the moment, which again makes the TPNW even more important.

And then on the ratification and universalization (of the TPNW), you are right, of course, we have now just under a hundred countries that have signed or ratified the TPNW. But the TPNW and the arguments on which the treaty is based--you have the legal dimension; the treaty is legally binding for countries that sign and ratify it.

And it has an important political dimension as well. And I think that is underrated. In fact, that is extremely important because if an increasing number of the international community demonstrates by signing and ratifying the TPNW--that it is the possession of nuclear weapons and the practice of nuclear deterrence that is seen as unlawful and illegitimate--I think that has a very powerful political impact.

And, in fact, we see some of it in the discussions taking place in the NPT right now.

This is something that will take time to change. But I’m quite optimistic, I have to say, that gradually this change in the legitimacy of the nuclear status quo will impact policies even if countries don't ratify the TPNW.

Q: I would say that the nuclear weapons states and other umbrella states, including Japan, are still afraid of the TPNW. And they refuse to sign or ratify it because they imagine it will eventually override the NPT rather than be complementary to the NPT Article 6. What do you think?

A: This is a completely bogus argument. It’s what you call a smokescreen argument. I think it is actually the reluctance to be ready to engage in a serious conversation about the legitimacy of nuclear deterrents and the assumptions on which this theory is built.

So, there are all these accusations against the TPNW but, in reality, I think nuclear weapons states and some of the countries under nuclear extended deterrence don’t want to have an international conversation about the humanitarian consequences and risks, because what is the end result?

What would be clear if we have this conversation is that countries that have nuclear weapons or rely on nuclear weapons impose a risk on countries that do not have these weapons with the argument of their own security. So that is an uncomfortable conversation. And that’s why you come with all sorts of accusations against the TPNW. I think that’s unfortunate. But I think over time we will have this conversation.

We must have this conversation, also because the integrity of the NPT demands it. Many states parties want to have this conversation. So really these accusations against the TPNW are politically motivated, unfortunately, and none of them hold up to scrutiny.

Q: How long do you think it will be until the universalization of the TPNW? Another decade or a few years?

A: The NPT is not universal. The NPT (was) negotiated in 1970 but is not universal. You have four countries that possess nuclear weapons that are not in the treaty. So, is anybody saying the NPT is irrelevant because not all countries that have these weapons (have signed it)? No. So universality is not, or universalization, is not absolute.

There is not a single treaty, maybe with the exception of the Charter of the United Nations, there’s no single treaty that has universal membership. Universality is a process. It’s getting more and more countries to sign and ratify the treaty. That’s one thing.

And the other process of universalization is to promote the reasoning, the arguments of the treaty. So, talking to Japanese policy makers or policy makers from another country about humanitarian consequences and risks of nuclear weapons is working for the universalization of the treaty, even if Japan or these other countries don’t yet sign the treaty.

So, I also reject the notion that unless we get everybody on board in a timeline of, whatever, five years or 10 years, the TPNW is a failure. That’s not how international treaties work, no. The NPT, it was well more than 20 years before France and China joined the NPT as well.

So, you have to give the TPNW a bit more time. We are very much at the beginning of this work.

Q: I understand the goal of the TPNW is to change the narrative or discourse of nuclear weapons. Am I correct?

A: Yes, of course. And this is a political process and a very difficult political process.