Photo/Illutration From left, Italy’s Defense Minister Guido Crosetto, Japan’s Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada and British Defense Secretary Ben Wallace pose for a photo before their trilateral meeting in Tokyo on March 16. (Pool via Reuters)

It has become clear that Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s government intends to relax the tight restrictions on exports of arms and open the door to selling lethal weapons to other countries.

The administration must not be allowed to gradually eviscerate the long-established principles concerning arms exports that have been upheld as part of Japan’s basic tenets as a pacifist nation without broad public debate.

The government has presented its own proposals to a task force of lawmakers set up by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and its junior coalition partner, Komeito, to review the guidelines for implementing the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology.

With regard to weapons systems Japan has developed jointly with other countries, the government has said it is “desirable to make it possible for Japan to transfer directly finished products and parts to a third country.”

This policy proposal clearly reflects the administration’s plan to develop a next-generation fighter jet with Britain and Italy.

The government argues that Japan’s restrictions on exports of such weapons would hinder exports from its development partners to other nations and could eventually affect the framework for joint development itself.

Fighter jets, however, are weapons to kill, pure and simple. The administration is apparently seeking to change the rules, which it fears could be an impediment to the fighter aircraft project, after it agreed with the two countries on the joint development plan.

But this is reversing the proper order of the policy-making process.

It is certainly difficult for a single country to develop a new fighter jet on its own since it requires a wide range of cutting-edge technologies and tremendous amounts of money. Joint development is a global trend in this field.

But the agreement among Japan, Britain and Italy to develop a next-generation fighter jet was formally announced only at the end of last year. The plan sets 2035 as the target year for completion, but details about how the three countries will work together are still being hashed out.

It is assumed that the fighter jet will be exported to other countries. It is difficult for Japan to control the partners’ sales of the aircraft and there can be no guarantee that it will not increase the risk of international conflict.

Japan will also be required to remain involved in the project over the long term for maintenance and management. This is a decision that must not be made in haste.

Under the current three principles concerning arms exports, only five categories of defense equipment--rescue, transport, warning, surveillance and minesweeping--can be sold to Japan’s security partners.

The government has adopted the position that these types of defense equipment can be armed with deadly weapons if necessary for the safety of these activities or operators.

This rule concerns, for example, minesweepers armed with cannons used to remove explosive naval mines and patrol vessels equipped with guns to force suspicious ships to stop.

The government has also decided to approve exports of parts--such as engines of Air Self-Defense Force’s F-15 fighters that are set to be retired in the coming years--by claiming that they are not weapons.

There is no denying the possibility that exports of these types of defense equipment and parts could lead to unlimited expansion of the scope of weapons Japan can export. If Japan can export lethal weapons it has developed with other nations, the reasoning goes, why not those Japan has developed on its own?

The ruling camp’s task force on this issue, which released in early July an interim report on its work that lists key points of the discussions, initially planned to restart its discussions in autumn or later.

However, Kishida instructed the group to resume working earlier. It is not clear when the working group will reach its conclusion.

But the administration must not be allowed to make this grave decision in the rash manner it revised the three key security policy documents to radically change the nation’s postwar defense policy principles.

This issue warrants exhaustive debate at the Diet and building a broad public consensus.

--The Asahi Shimbun, Aug. 25