During a meeting in Washington on Jan. 13, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida informed U.S. President Joe Biden that Japan had revised three key national security documents a month earlier.

The revision included a decision to allow Japan to possess enemy base strike capability, officially known as counterstrike capability, and “substantially increase” the country’s defense budget. Biden expressed an all-out endorsement for the measures.

Kishida was also quoted as telling Biden that Japan plans to purchase U.S.-made Tomahawk cruise missiles.

It is understandable that Tokyo and Washington should work together more closely to deal with the worsening security environment.

However, the major shift in Japan’s security policy was decided without a broad-based national debate.

Kishida will never obtain broad understanding and support of the public, which would be indispensable for national defense, as long as he continues relying on that decision alone in pursuing a stronger alliance with the United States.

During an earlier meeting with Biden in Tokyo in May, Kishida explained his “resolve to examine” the option of allowing Japan to possess enemy base strike capability and his “determination” to substantially increase the nation’s defense spending.

In a sense, Kishida kept the pledge he made at the time.

In reality, however, no proper explanation has been given in Japan on either issue. The conclusions alone were presented during the closing days of last year.

In his speech at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies following the summit with Biden, Kishida praised his own policy step as “one of the most historically critical milestones.”

He said his “decision” follows in the footsteps of precedents including Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida’s 1951 signing of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi’s 1960 revision of the treaty and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s decision to partially lift Japan's self-imposed ban on the right to exercise collective self-defense. 

However, Kishida has hardly provided opportunities for extensive debate and discussions that a decision of such gravity warrants.

The Biden administration presented the idea of “integrated deterrence” in the U.S. National Security Strategy established in October. The concept calls on allies to strengthen their own military capabilities, which the United States will integrate into its own deterrence.

It is only too natural that Washington welcomed Tokyo’s policy shift, which was in step with that approach.

However, the interests of Japan and the United States do not always coincide completely, not the least over ties with China, whose actions both countries have defined as the “greatest strategic challenge.”

We are left to wonder if Kishida is willing and able to make independent decisions each time without being one-sidedly dragged into toeing Washington’s policy line.

In his speech in Washington, Kishida referred to Ukrainians fighting Russia’s aggression to emphasize the “importance of the will of each and every citizen to proactively defend the country.”

He had also said the same thing at a news conference after he had the three key national security documents revised.

However, such wording will never resonate with the public as long as efforts to gain their understanding of and consent to the policy shift, which has such a serious bearing on the nation’s course, are kept on the back burner.

There are concerns that possession of an enemy base strike capability, which emasculates Japan’s traditional defense-only policy, could backfire and prompt regional destabilization and an arms race.

It is not yet known how the division of roles in the bilateral security alliance, where Japan’s Self-Defense Forces serve as the “shield” and the U.S. forces as the “sword” of sorts, will change.

The source of financing for doubling Japan’s defense spending, as Kishida directed, also remains a question.

The Kishida administration has yet to answer these and many other questions and concerns up front.

Kishida should make himself available for intensive discussions on the matter when the Diet is in session again from Jan. 23.

He should do so, without shying away, this time for sure.

--The Asahi Shimbun, Jan. 15