The Kishida administration has yet to offer specific information on discussions among policymakers over the question of whether Japan should possess the military capability to strike military bases within enemy territory. This is a key issue for planned revisions to three key security policy documents, including the National Security Strategy, to be announced at the end of the year.

Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has repeatedly said his government is considering all options, without ruling out any proposal, to fundamentally enhance Japan’s defense capabilities.

The government, however, is reportedly already considering the introduction of U.S.-made long-range cruise missiles as if the issue has already been settled. This is an unacceptably premature policy action.

Japanese officials are sounding out the U.S. government about purchasing Tomahawk cruise missiles. Tokyo is currently working to extend the range of a domestically made missile from 200 kilometers to around 1,000 km with an eye on it being capable to strike enemy bases. But the enhanced missile is not expected to be fully deployed until fiscal 2026 or later. The government apparently believes that the tried and tested Tomahawk will be a good stop-gap measure until the Japanese missile is upgraded.

Tomahawk missiles, which can be launched from the ground or sea, fly at a low altitude while continually adjusting trajectory to strike targets with great accuracy within a range of about 1,600 km.

Tomahawks were first deployed by the U.S. military during the 1991 Gulf War. They have since been used in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as facilities related to chemical weapons manufacturing in Syria. The Japanese government is considering retrofitting Self-Defense Forces Aegis destroyers so they can be equipped with Tomahawks.

But talks on the issue of giving the SDF the capability to strike enemy bases as a “counterattack” strategy have only just begun between the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, and its junior coalition partner, Komeito, which has been calling for cautious discussions.

This proposal raises a host of legal issues, such as whether the step will represent a departure from Japan’s “senshu boei” strictly defensive security policy principle based on the Constitution. The strong policy focus on military capability could provoke a regional arms race that leads to greater instability in the region. Other questions center on whether it will truly strengthen deterrence for greater national security and how to assess the costs and risks of taking this course.

The Kishida administration is engaged in behind-the-scenes negotiations with the United States over the purchase of Tomahawks while turning a deaf ear to the various questions and doubts being raised by the proposal and scoring no success in fostering public consensus for the issue. It cannot hope to win broad public understanding and support.

The planned revisions to three security policy documents could result in a radical change in Japan’s highly restrictive postwar security policy. In addition to talks within the ruling coalition, exhaustive bipartisan debate on the policy change at the Diet, as the body of elected representatives of the people, is also needed.

If Japan acquires the capability to strike enemy bases, the traditional division of roles between the SDF, which is supposed to be a defensive “shield,” and U.S. forces stationed in Japan, which act as a “spear” for attacks, will inevitably change.

Last month, the Biden administration announced its new “National Defense Strategy,” which propounds the concept of “integrated deterrence” by bringing together the defense capabilities of both the United States and its allies to respond to security threats. The document calls on allies to beef up their “investment” in capabilities necessary for strengthening deterrence.

This new U.S. deterrence strategy is driving calls in Japan for a sharp increase in defense spending and introduction of capabilities to strike enemy bases.

Tokyo’s security alliance with Washington is the linchpin to Japan’s national security. But that does not mean the national interests of Japan and the United States are completely aligned.

Instead of simply following the U.S. lead, Japan needs to map out its own security strategy independently.

--The Asahi Shimbun, Nov. 1