Will moves by the government to acquire the military capability to strike enemy bases truly serve as an effective deterrent that makes the nation safer, or rather end up heightening tensions in the region?

The proposal, if implemented, would effectively eviscerate Japan’s cardinal security policy principle of “senshu boei” (strictly defensive national defense) and mark a radical departure from the highly restrictive defense strategy the nation has pursued throughout the postwar period. The government and ruling coalition have yet to respond to many crucial questions surrounding the idea. The ruling camp must not be allowed to make a rash decision without winning broad public support.

The ruling Liberal Democratic Party and its junior coalition partner, Komeito, have started talks on planned revisions to three key security policy documents, including National Security Strategy, which will be announced later this year. The proposal to give the Self-Defense Forces the capability to strike bases and other military targets in enemy territory is the primary issue at stake.

However, the “chatter” in official circles is that this proposal will not be a major topic for the government’s panel of experts tasked with discussing changes. As a result, policy decisions concerning the proposal are likely to be made through talks within the ruling coalition.

In April, the LDP submitted a set of proposals to Prime Minister Fumio Kishida regarding the capability to strike enemy bases. North Korea and China are two of Japan’s near neighbors. The former has test-fired ballistic missiles in rapid succession in recent weeks while the latter possesses a huge arsenal of missiles.

Both countries have made rapid and worrisome advances in missile technology by acquiring the capability to follow an irregular trajectory or fly at hypersonic speed. Proponents of the proposal to acquire the ability to strike targets argue that the system to intercept incoming missiles alone is not enough to defend the nation. They contend that the ability to also stage counterattacks would deter enemy forces from attacking Japan.

If counterattacks were launched only after Japan came under attack, this nation’s response could be viewed as being in line with the “senshu boei” principle. On the other hand, the LDP’s position is that Japan can mount attacks against enemy targets when it is clearly recognized that an enemy has embarked on a war footing. But that is an extremely difficult judgment call to make. Any misjudgment could lead to a pre-emptive strike, an action that would constitute a violation of international law.

Komeito is demanding that clear and strict criteria be put in place for determining how the process is initiated. But the LDP and the government do not want to set such criteria for fear of imposing legal restrictions on defense operations during a security crisis.

This difference is one important issue that needs to be addressed in the talks between the two sides.

The question, however, is whether it is realistically feasible in the first place to accurately identify legitimate enemy targets for counterattacks. It also remains unclear whether it is even possible to acquire sufficient deterrence against an enemy which has an immense stockpile of missiles. Debate on the proposal should start with addressing these fundamental questions to gauge whether it is really a good idea for Japan to have the ability to strike enemy bases.

It is also disturbing that the LDP’s proposals say targets of counterattacks include not just the enemy’s missile bases but also command and control functions. Targeting an enemy’s military headquarters or even political nerve centers would be a clear departure from the “senshu boei” principle, which limits the scope of Japan’s defense operations to the very minimum necessary for self-defense. This deviation from principle could provoke potential enemies to take stronger counteraction.

With only two months or so left until the government announces revisions to the three key defense policy documents, Kishida has yet to offer specific information about debate within his administration on the proposal to introduce the ability to strike enemy bases. During the current Diet session, all he has said on the issue is that the administration is accelerating debate without excluding any options.

Given that mobilizing the SDF for defense operations requires approval by the Diet, no decision can be made on the issue without meticulous and exhaustive debate at the Diet, whose members are representative of all the people.

--The Asahi Shimbun, Oct. 20