Photo/Illutration Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa, right, and U.S. President Bill Clinton at a Tokyo hotel in July 1993 after Japan and the United States agreed on the framework for new bilateral economic talks (Asahi Shimbun file photo)

Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa prepared to weather a barrage of U.S. complaints at his first summit with U.S. President Bill Clinton in 1993, whom he held as a "new breed of human," according to a newly declassified government document. 

Japanese officials had assessed the new president as “pragmatic,” the opposite of his predecessor, President George H.W. Bush, at a time of difficult trade relations between the two nations.

The U.S. stance toward Japan was hardening due to the huge trade deficits it had rung up for many years, and it was expected that Clinton would make greater demands when the two leaders met in Washington.

The records from 1993, a volatile year that saw a change of government in both nations amid the trade frictions, were released in December by the Foreign Ministry.

A month after Clinton took office, Japanese Ambassador to the United States Takakazu Kuriyama cautioned Japanese officials in Tokyo on the changing political climate in a cable classified as “secret with limited circulation.”

“We should face up to the reality that the era is over in which the United States, backed by unrivaled competitiveness, had dominated as the leader of free trade,” Kuriyama said in the Feb. 16, 1993, document.

In 1992, the U.S. gross domestic product stood at $6.5 trillion and Japan’s GDP was $3.9 trillion, about 60 percent of the U.S. figure.

In terms of per capita GDP, Japan surpassed the United States with $32,000 to $25,000.

The United States had begun to take a harsh look at Japan after the collapse of the Soviet Union, its longtime Cold War rival, in 1991.

Japan accumulated a huge trade surplus over the United States while relying on the country for its national security.

Prioritizing economic policy, Clinton defeated the incumbent Bush in the November 1992 presidential race.

Kuriyama continued in the cable: “President Clinton’s perception of Japan-U.S. relations is two-fold: cooperation and competition. That means that Washington would be less likely to make unilateral concessions even though Tokyo is an important ally.”

Foreign Minister Michio Watanabe, who traveled to the United States just before Kuriyama’s cable was sent, experienced the intensifying U.S. pressure on Japan firsthand.

A “secret” record with “limited circulation” disclosed that Clinton referred to the U.S. $40 billion trade deficit with Japan when Watanabe met with him.

Watanabe’s U.S. counterpart, Warren Christopher, told him that Japan would need to consider additional government spending and that he hoped that Japan’s imports from the United States would expand through increased opening of Japanese markets and an economic stimulus package.

Watanabe conveyed Miyazawa’s message to Clinton that the prime minister did not believe that the United States enacting a punitive trade law against Japan was a good idea.

It was advice from the experienced politician who became prime minister in 1991 and had taken great pains to cooperate with Bush, who called for the introduction of a new world order following the end of the Cold War.

The Super 301 trade law refers to provisions of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, which allowed the United States to impose economic sanctions against nations that it regarded as engaging in unfair trade practices.

The act expired in 1990.

But the Clinton administration was considering reviving the act in the face of the growing U.S. trade imbalance with some countries.

Japan grew concerned that it could be singled out as target to “correct” the trade inequities. 

The leaders of Japan and the United States came in sharp contrast as the two countries grappled with the thorny trade issue.

Miyazawa, then 73, was a longtime politician who had been deeply involved in Japan-U.S. affairs, including his time as a senior Finance Ministry official.

Clinton was much younger at 46.

The declassified document from 1993 also contained a “secret” material describing exchanges between Miyazawa and Hisashi Owada, the highest ranking official of the Foreign Ministry, on March 12, ahead of the scheduled April 16 summit.

At their meeting at the prime minister’s office, Owada shared his assessment that the Clinton administration would have no choice but to take a hard line against other countries as it was pushing programs that would inflict a heavy burden on Americans to rebuild the U.S. economy and society.

In reply, Miyazawa said that he would have to deal with the administration of a “new breed of humans,” different from the preceding administration, according to the record.

Owada described the Bush administration as “very soft-hearted,” while characterizing the Clinton administration as “pragmatic.”

The diplomat added that the Clinton administration was not necessarily anti-Japan, but would not hesitate to assert its demands in negotiations.

Miyazawa conceded that he should be fully aware that Clinton had a different mindset and perspective about Japan-U.S. relations, given that he was born in the postwar years.

The expansion of domestic demand through increased government funds was what Miyazawa sought to do as part of the “cooperation” with Washington as Clinton hurried to produce tangible results on the economic front.

At an April 1, 1993, news conference, the prime minister pledged to set aside funds of an “unprecedented scale” for the fiscal 1993 supplementary budget to stimulate domestic demand.

But the step apparently was insufficient to narrow the differences between the two sides.

On April 8, Kuriyama and Koichiro Matsuura, senior deputy minister for foreign affairs, held talks in Washington with Robert Rubin, assistant to the president for economic policy.

Rubin warned that the trade friction issue would explode unless the Japanese market opened wider to U.S. exports. 

He also said that Clinton could take action since he was being increasingly frustrated by the trade issue.

According to a memorandum classified as “secret for indefinite periods,” Miyazawa complained when Matsuura reported to him on April 12 on the details of the meeting with Rubin.

“Since all the people around me advised me to go to Washington, I am going, but I am not very enthusiastic about it,” Miyazawa said. “The entire purpose of my trip will be to hear all the U.S. complaints it has to make. I still believe that there are no specific measures to resolve bilateral economic issues.”

Miyazawa resigned as prime minster in August 1993 to take responsibility for a crushing defeat that his Liberal Democratic Party suffered in the Lower House election the previous month.