Calling each other by their first names, Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga and U.S. President Joe Biden continued a longstanding tradition of emphasizing the strong bonds between the two countries during their first summit meeting in Washington on April 16.

Biden, who has stressed alliances since taking office, was determined to demonstrate to China and a global audience that Japan and the United States have an unshakable friendship.

Suga, on the other hand, wanted to downplay his reputation that foreign affairs are not his strong point by being the first foreign leader to hold a face-to-face meeting with Donald Trump's successor.

With such common intent on both sides, it was comparatively easy to portray the summit as a resounding success by emphasizing agreed joint cooperation on issues facing the world.

However, the core issue was, as Biden said during their joint news conference, how to respond to the “challenges from China.”

With the U.S. administration strengthening its hardline stance against China, Suga was Washington's obvious first choice for direct talks with Biden so as to place Tokyo at the forefront of its moves to deal with Beijing and because it expected Japan would fall into line.

China is Japan’s largest trading partner, which goes a long way in explaining Japan's decision not to impose sanctions against China for its human rights abuses in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. Japan is the only member of the Group of Seven advanced nations to shy away from taking such action.

With clamoring in the government, ruling Liberal Democratic Party and business sector to maintain cooperative ties with China because of the trade relationship, attention focused on how Japan would navigate the delicate balance between the United States and China.

The joint statement issued by the two leaders after their meeting suggests that Japan passively went along with many areas in which the United States sought its cooperation. With regard to human rights abuses of the Uighurs, the statement said the two leaders “share serious concerns.”

Government officials in the past were reluctant to impose sanctions on human rights issues, citing a lack of a legal basis for such action. Tokyo now faces the task of showing how it intends to act and what results it is seeking in this area.

TAIWAN A POSSIBLE TURNING POINT

A passage in the joint statement of the two leaders emphasizing “the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait” could serve as a game changer in ties between Japan, the United States and China.

Taiwan was last mentioned in a statement issued by the leaders of Japan and the United States in 1969 prior to Okinawa’s return to Japanese sovereignty. But the political landscape, China’s growing military and economic prowess, coupled with Japan’s defense structure and legal framework, are now markedly different from when Prime Minister Eisaku Sato and U.S. President Richard Nixon met.

Consensus on Taiwan between Suga and Biden led Tetsuo Kotani, a professor of international politics at Meikai University, to say, “A precondition for dealing with a military confrontation over Taiwan will now be putting together a joint tactical plan by Japan and the United States.”

Beijing, it hardly needs to be pointed out, will raise strong objections to the mention of Taiwan, which could prompt it to impose retaliatory measures involving the business sector and/or military pressure.

Suga's apparent determination to carry out what was decided at the meeting with Biden remains a source of concern.

Washington had long viewed Suga as a leader happier to take a conciliatory stance toward China than risk earning Beijing's displeasure. There are also no signs the Suga administration has moved to compile a new strategy toward China that cuts across ministerial lines.

With priority placed on reaping the political benefits of being the first foreign leader to meet with Biden, one cannot help but feel that Japan did not adequately prepare for the summit.

Until now, Japan has relied hugely on the United States for its national security and to China for its economy. But with confrontation intensifying between the United States and China in areas as diverse as military and economic matters, as well as human rights and technology, maintaining a diplomatic posture of separating roles between those two nations has reached its limit.

Next year will mark the 50th anniversary of normalization of ties between Japan and China. One focus in that respect is when to reschedule a state visit to Japan by Chinese President Xi Jinping that has been postponed due to the novel coronavirus pandemic.

Other issues further complicate matters.

For one, China is expected to overtake the United States in terms of gross domestic product in 2028.

Beijing in recent years has increasingly been assertive and taken provocative actions around the disputed Senkaku Islands claimed by Japan as well as toward Taiwan.

The major problem facing Japan is how to maintain good economic ties while also dealing with China’s growing military presence.

Without question, the United States is an important ally. But its national interests do not always dovetail with Japan’s.

Due to geography and economic ties, the relationship between Japan and China is quite different from that between China and the United States. Stability in the Japan-China relationship also offers huge gains in the national security field.

As confrontation between the United States and China intensifies, Japan’s strategic value to those two nations will also increase.

That is why some in the government, including a high-ranking Foreign Ministry official, felt that Japan should take the initiative in diplomacy with the United States and China by forming a strategy toward China before the Biden administration began initiating policy moves in foreign affairs.

Even though the Biden administration took office four months after Suga replaced Shinzo Abe as prime minister, it rapidly put together a strategy toward China and pulled ahead of Japan.

In light of that development, Japan should move away from a reactive stance and demonstrate a more assertive posture in its dealings with the United States and China. That will require putting together a comprehensive strategy that involves every aspect of Japan’s diplomatic, national security and economic interests.

If that is not done, Japan’s diplomacy will be a meandering one in which it is always being forced to show both the United States and China that it is on their side.