China showcased its military might at a parade led by President Xi Jinping that marked the Communist Party’s 70th anniversary in power and sent a message that the nation is competing for superpower status.

The parade in October featured the latest weapons systems, including fighter jets and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), of a country once viewed as antiquated.

Elbridge Colby, former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development, recently spoke with The Asahi Shimbun about China’s military ambitions, particularly over Taiwan, and what he believes neighboring countries, including Japan, should do to prepare for such security threats.

As deputy assistant secretary of defense, Colby was the lead official in the development of the 2018 National Defense Strategy under then-Secretary of State Jim Mattis.

Colby also served as director of the defense program from 2017 to 2018 and a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) from 2014 to 2017.

Excerpts from the interview follow:

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Question: What is your analysis of China’s military parade in October, in which the country displayed many weapons, including drones and state-of-the-art missiles?

Colby: I think the fundamental reality is that we are seeing very clearly that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has gone in a space of two decades from a fairly primitive, second-rate military to an absolutely first-rate military.

In some respects, China can match, or, even in some areas, may exceed that of the U.S. military. And that was on display (at the parade where) we saw the DF-41, a road-mobile nuclear-tipped ICBM. (The parade) demonstrated that we are dealing with a state essentially with survivable nuclear forces, which, of course, changes the calculus with anyone.

I think the days of considering the Chinese to be a future threat are long gone. The Chinese military challenge is very present and has actually been here for some time. What is interesting is the kind of political signal that this was sending, … that China is very clearly wanting to be seen as a very, very powerful military.

I think (China’s arms buildup) is a very clear message for Asia, (and particularly) Japan. Above all, Japan is certainly the most at risk of the major countries from China’s military power, although not the only one. … For us here in the United States, the era of unchallenged U.S. military superiority is definitely over.

Q: When did the U.S. government change its views toward China and regard it as a serious competitor? What do you think triggered such a paradigm shift?

A: I think there had been growing recognition from about 2014 in the Pentagon that the Chinese military capability and challenge was considerably greater than had been understood. The political level in Washington was more delayed but now appreciates this reality more and more.

I think there was a realization based on assessment, watching what the Chinese were up to, which includes a 7- to 10-percent increase in defense budget year after year after year and significant reform of their military.

The states that matter the most are the ones with the most power, and power ultimately comes down to military power and economic power.

Q: Regarding the Taiwan issue, I’ve heard that, in an analysis, the Xi administration predicts that the United States would not intervene in a Taiwan crisis to avoid a full-scale war. What is your take on that?

A: I think that’s a very grave mistake if that’s the way that the Chinese leadership is thinking about it. I think the U.S. policy has been reiterated a number of times in this administration. If anything, it’s become clearer. … The United States is opposed to the use of force to settle the issue of Taiwan as reflected in the Taiwan Relations Act.

And I think there is a great deal of sympathy for the people in Taiwan within the administration and certainly on Capitol Hill ….

But I think China would be grossly mistaken if they thought that the use of force against … Taiwan would not carry a very, very strong probability of a U.S. military response.

The United States has contemplated that for a long time. If you look at, for instance, the Rand Corporation’s work, you can see that the United States thinks a lot about military scenarios regarding Taiwan.

So the critical thing is to try to conduct what I call an effective “denial defense,” which is essentially to deny the People’s Republic the ability to seize Taiwan in a fait accompli, in particular.

We also need to worry about … the possibility of a PLA blockade or bombardment strategy. But I think (for) the PLA, the most attractive approach is … a complete quick seizure of Taiwan, and they would hope that the government of (Taiwan) would collapse and surrender.

What the United States is already shifting towards in the National Defense Strategy (NDS) is this kind of denial defense, which is designed to have lethal and resilient forces without the kind of dominance that the U.S. military has enjoyed since Desert Storm.

Instead of the situation, say in Desert Storm, where there’s this very methodical buildup, and only then do we launch to first establish air supremacy and only then contest the political objectives on the ground, our forces (are) moving in the direction of being able to hit the attacker, even without that kind of supremacy or taking down their air defense systems and so forth.

If you look at the way our forces are moving, they're being prepared to operate forward or get forward in a more survivable fashion and reach out and strike, even without that degree of dominance. So, you won’t see something like a six- month preparation and only then attack. You’ll see our forces hopefully contesting the attack from the beginning and then over time surging, more capabilities.

Q: You have stated that Japan should continue to increase its defense budget to counter a rising China. Is that the majority opinion inside the current U.S. administration?

A: Yes, I think so. I think that everybody understands that China is overall the key priority. Everybody, or most people, understand that allies are critical and that we can’t do this alone.

Japan is the most important state in Asia other than China. We are spending 3 percent of our GDP (on defense). Japan is spending 1 to 1.5 percent, depending on how you measure it. But it’s not going to fly. Just as a simple reality, Japan has to do more.

If Japan is restricted to 1 percent (of GDP for defense expenditures) or something like that level , (while) China is spending maybe 2 percent of an economy that’s 10 times the size of Japan, things are way out of balance.

And then somebody in America is going to say, well, Japan only spends 1 percent, and then we’re told that China is a big military problem.

But if Japan is OK with spending 1 percent, why can’t we in America spend 1 percent? And people could say, well, I guess it’s a revealed judgment about how serious Japan (is).

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Kenji Minemura worked as the Chief Foreign Affairs Correspondent in Washington, D.C., and was previously a correspondent in Beijing.